During the past century, the theme of the theological doctrine of man as the image of God—Imago Dei—has been taken up frequently under the roof and within the walls of the Dominican House of Studies. To cite only one example, it pleases me to recall a former faculty member, Fr. Elwood Ferrer Smith, O.P. (+1992), longtime Regent of Studies, who taught moral theology to several generations of Dominican priests. In 1950, Fr. Smith wrote: “So vital is the doctrine that man is the image of God that we cannot understand the teachings of Christ apart from it.”

It would be difficult, then, to imagine a more foundational theme for Catholic theology, even though Dominicans may have been among the few throughout the modern period to retain interest in the imago as a key theological topic.

Other Dominican instructors impressed on their clerical students—and after the 1970s, on lay students—the high significance of the doctrine of the imago for Christian living. Fr. Augustine Di Noia’s 2003 public lecture in Rome, “Imago Dei—Imago Christi: The Theological Foundations of Christian Humanism,” reflects themes of his teaching here in the 1980s and points to a significance of the imago doctrine that moves beyond the level of the speculative. Another former professor at the Dominican House of Studies, Fr. William J. Hill, O.P., was wont to remind his students that use of the psychological model does not solve the mystery of the Trinity, though it illuminates what remains a mystery.

In the Summa theologiae, Aquinas takes up the theme of imago Dei in the second half of his treatise on man. At question 93 of the prima pars, the Common Doctor sets about to consider “the end or term of man’s production, in so far as he is said to have been made after God’s image and likeness (factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei).” Aquinas starts with the question, “Whether there is an image of God in man?” The inquiry in nine articles continues to probe the psychological model for the imago that Saint Augustine, mainly, has bequeathed to subsequent Western Christian reflection. At the end of question 93, Aquinas inquires in article nine about what constitutes the difference between image and likeness. Ad imaginem et similitudinem. “Similitudo.” “Likeness.”
Why the two words? We learn from reading this article that the patristic period proffers at least two approaches to answering this question. Aquinas cites two familiar authorities: Saint Augustine (+430), who considered likeness as preliminary to image, and Saint John Damascene (+c.750), who thought that likeness signified the exactness or perfection of image. Aquinas reconciles these apparently conflicting authorities by appeal to the Aristotelian doctrine of the transcendentals, which allows for properties of being, such as the true and the good, to be “both common to all things and applicable to any single thing.” The work of Jacques Maritain captures the temper of Aquinas’ mind. In *The Degrees of Knowledge*, Maritain wrote: “To scatter and to confuse are both equally inimical to the nature of the mind. ‘No one,’ says [John] Tauler, ‘understands true distinction better than they who have entered into unity.’” Aquinas seeks to unite rather than to scatter “image” and “likeness.”

Recall Maritain’s axiom, “Distinguish to Unite.”

Distinctions can scatter. A text found in the second book of Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* insists on distinguishing image and likeness by identifying strictly one with intellect and the other with will. In reply to this interpretation of the biblical text, Aquinas applies his transcendental “method” to the argument that since God put two words in the Genesis narrative, image and likeness are to be taken disjunctively. Aquinas begins by pointing out that there is something of love in knowledge and of knowledge in love: “love of the word, which is a beloved awareness (*amata notitia*), belongs to the idea of ‘image’; but love of virtue belongs to ‘likeness,’ just as virtue does.” Aquinas shows that the transcendental properties of being, the true and the good, make it difficult to impose a distinction that would render “image” one thing and “likeness” another. An *amata notitia* precedes virtue, which may be thought of a *docta bonitas*, even as the virtuous life perfects the *dilectio verbi*, which enjoys a special affinity to the Second Divine Person, the Logos-Word. This reference is made without prejudice to Aquinas’ position that the image of God in man is of the whole Trinity. What this text reveals is that “image and likeness” both pertain to discerning the nature of authentic virtue, which Aquinas insists remains the foundation of true friendship.

As the above-cited text from *Summa theologiae* (la, q. 93, art. 9, ad 4) adumbrates, the anthropology of the image governs the moral theology of Saint Thomas. The teleology of the *secunda pars* finds its moorings in what scholastics have called the “obediential potency of human nature for completion in God.” This discussion is one that still vexes contemporary Catholic theology. Since the mid-twentieth-century, the whipping boy has become the theretofore revered sixteenth-century Thomist commentator Cardinal Cajetan. Elsewhere, I have remarked that some future historian of Catholic thought will have to explain this mid-twentieth-century assault on the theological trustworthiness of Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan. Since this Dominican’s death in 1534, his commentary on the *Summa* has been considered authoritative by most Catholic theologians. And still is today by classical Thomists. In a book at The Catholic University of America Press, Professor Ralph McNerny gives a clear and well documented analysis of the criticisms raised by the layman Etienne Gilson and the Jesuit Henri De Lubac against what they took to be the commentatorial distortions of Aquinas’ texts engendered by Cardinal Cajetan’s commentary. McNerny also rebuts these criticisms: Gilson called into question Cajetan’s essentialism, whereas De Lubac, himself later a cardinal, criticized Cajetan’s conception of human nature’s openness to divine grace. These critical voices were encouraged, moreover, by the Dominican intellectual historian Marie-Dominique Chenu, who earlier had inveighed against the alleged Baroque systematization of Thomist thought that, so he was persuaded, better reflected the views of the secular rationalist, Christian Wolff (1679–1754), than it did the authentic tradition that flows from Aquinas. In *Praeambula fidei*, Ralph McNerny challenges the legitimacy of repudiating Renaissance Thomism, and he does so based on the common principles of Catholic theology.

Thomists of course should avoid all Schadenfreude. “These are melancholy matters to relate,” laments McNerny. Good guys squabbling with one another. At the same time, these very same issues form part of the difficulties that face twenty-first-century Thomists who want to pick up on what Aquinas has to say about the *imago Dei*. If we know nothing of human nature, we can say neither what
it is, nor whether it is, nor whether it has been assumed. We also do not know what claim nature has on God. As Henri De Lubac expressed it at the close of his first chapter inAugustinianism and Modern Theology, “In my view, which is that of every Catholic, any idea of a claim of created nature in relation to the supernatural should be absolutely excluded.”18 De Lubac is repeating the view of Michael Baius (1513–89) that in the state of original justice, innocence and its promised eternal reward were not supernatural gifts of God to man, but the necessary complement of human nature itself.19 This avowal of De Lubac is all the more arresting and impressive coming from an author who did not concur with Aquinas’ teaching in De malo (q.1, art. 5, ad 15) that the deprivation of the beatific vision in a hypothetical state of pure nature would not be a punishment. Hence even an author who is associated with denial of the claim that human nature could in a different order of providence be ordered to a lesser felicity apart from grace also (see above) affirms that the order of nature is distinct from and has no claim upon the supernatural.

It can be difficult—from the vantage of the radicalization of De Lubac’s arguments regarding the natural desire for God undertaken later by certain members of theComunio circle—for some scholars to see the degree to which De Lubac himself constrained the radicality of his own thesis by his prior affirmation of Catholic faith that “any idea of a claim of created nature in relation to the supernatural should be absolutely excluded.” We could all benefit from another look at Pope Saint Pius V’s initial condemnations of Baius, who repudiated the scholastic thought of his day and claimed to discover a pristine account of grace and nature in the writings of the Fathers, especially Saint Augustine. Baius would have been taken as a conservative reformer! Suffice it for now to observe that the interpretation of how theimago Dei

works has occasioned friendly and sometimes not-so-friendly disputes among Catholic theologians during the heyday of Leonine Thomism. In my view, while we may have moved beyond the difficulties, we have not resolved them.

This circumstance brings its own infelicity. When we recall what Fr. Ferrer Smith had to say about the importance of the doctrine of theimago Dei,Thomists should genuinely rejoice to discover that there are students of Catholic theology who have not been intimidated or misled by the “melancholy matters” to which Ralph McInerny refers. One of the best examples of sound Thomist teaching on theimago Deiand its reaching out for God appears in the recent and sterling scholarship of Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters.20 This work has the great virtue of outlining the consensus of Thomistic commentators of many schools (including even Suarez) on the question of obediential potency by contrast with the accounts given by De Lubac and others like Jorge Laporta.21 Feingold also offers at the end of his study a “Conclusion: Summary of the Arguments Showing That There Is No Innate Appetite for the Vision of God, But Only an Elicited and Imperfect Natural Desire.” This summary should be required reading for anyone who wishes to affirm that, for Aquinas, there is properly speaking a natural desire for intrinsically supernatural beatitude.22 Indeed, for anyone who wants to understand how theimago Deiworks, as it were.

The Sacraments of the Church

There are only two direct references to theimago Deiin thetertia pars. So it may not come as a surprise to discover that one rarely sees the theme of theimago Deidiscussed in connection with the sacraments of the Church.23 The two references toimago Deiappear in discussions that consider the capacity of man createdad imaginem Dei for beatific fulfillment. One reference occurs when Aquinas discusses whether the Holy Spirit should be called the Father of Christ in respect of his humanity, and the other when Aquinas explains that Christ enjoys possession of the beatific vision while still a wayfarer.24 At the same time, the doctrine of theimago Deiundergirds everything that is taught (and indeed of what would have been taught) in thetertia pars. In order to see why theimago Deisuffuses thetertia pars, it is necessary to return to the discussion of the image in theprimapars.

In primapars,q. 93, art. 4, Aquinas inquires whether theimago Deiis found in every man. His reply is that some realization of theimago Deiindeed occurs in all men, even in sinners. The following distinctions apply to the mode of realization:

- The first mode is man’s natural aptitude for understanding and loving God.
• The second mode appears in those who actually or habitually, though while on earth imperfectly, know and love God.

• The third mode [appears] in those who know and love God perfectly. This last group is comprised of the saints in heaven who have attained the image according to the likeness of glory. So the first image is found in all men, the second only in the justified, and the third, as I said, only in the blessed. This tripartite division of the *imago Dei* is not peculiar to Aquinas. The Christian tradition returns frequently to the image of creation, the image of grace, and the image of glory. If recent spiritual and theological authors eschew this tripartite division of man’s relationship to God, then fault may lie with some provocateurs of those “melancholy matters” that Ralph McInerny relates in his book, *Praeambula fidei*. A recent statement from the International Theological Commission acknowledges Aquinas’s tripartite distinction, and contrasts his teaching on the *imago Dei* with that of Saint Bonaventure and of the fourteenth-century Dominican Meister Eckhart (c.1260–c.1328). The movement of the image as realized in sonship receives a dynamic interpretation in Aquinas. The same document also affirms that the sixteenth-century reformers eschewed the notion of the image as ontological, and translated the doctrine into one of relation. That is, something extrinsic to man.

Image gives way to sonship. Fr. Di Noia reminds us in his lecture, *Imago Dei—Imago Christi*, that the Second Vatican Council, Pope John Paul II, and Pope Benedict XVI express the vision that “the human person is created in the image of God (*imago Dei*) in order to grow into the image of Christ (*imago Christi*).” The *tertia pars* presents Christ as perfectly embodying the divine sonship: “*Christus autem est Filius Dei secundum perfectam rationem filiationis.*” Whether in the treatment of the metaphysics of the Incarnation that begins the *tertia pars* or in the account of the mysteries of Christ’s life that completes what Aquinas has to say about the Savior, his emphasis remains on Christ, “the Son of God by nature, [and who] under no aspect may be said to be an adoptive son.” Adoptive sonship, on the other hand, remains the preferred way to speak about the actualization of the divine image of God in each one who has been born into the new life of water and the Holy Spirit. The graced image is the grace of sonship. The source of this grace in the Church remains Christ, Son by nature not adoption. The language of sonship of course comes from the New Testament. Aquinas invents nothing. He rather looks for the connections between revealed truths. So Fr. O’Neill can explain further, “the member of Christ is an adopted son of God because he is to share in Christ’s inheritance.” The doctrine of the image as realized in sonship receives a dynamic interpretation in Aquinas. The movement of the image of God remains Godward, teleological, perfective, bound for glory. We come then to a familiar sequence for modern theology: anthropology, Christology, and eschatology.

It is important to note that Fr. O’Neill considers the following theological topics required ones to illuminate the question of adoptive sonship.

• The first, as we have seen, is the image of God. *Imago Dei*. Aquinas locates the reason for man’s privileges and responsibilities in the imaging that occurs in the intellect and in freedom. The human creature can know and love, and this native “capacity for the supreme good” can be fulfilled by a revelation of God’s inward life that summons man to a participation in the divine knowledge and love. Aquinas regards the adopted son of God as the equivalent of man as the image of God by grace. Sonship of this kind, on Aquinas’ account, consists in the reproduction of the life of the Blessed Trinity in man through his activity of supernatural knowledge and love. For the Thomist, the emphasis in sonship remains theological—knowing and loving God, faith, hope, and charity—not principally humanistic.

• The second topic required to elucidate adoptive sonship is likeness to God, which is always to be understood analogically.

• The third is participation in the divine goodness, which achieves its highest degree only in those whom God Himself chooses and positively transmits to it through predestination. There is no room in the Thomist vision of sonship for naturalism or Pelagian strategies.

To sum up: “If the adopted son of God is to be equated with man as the image of God by grace, then it must be said that sonship consists in the reproduction of the life of
the Blessed Trinity in man through his activity of supernatural knowledge and love.”33 This knowledge and love of the Persons of the Trinity occur only within the context of the theological and infused moral virtues, which under the impulse of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit can produce a “semi-experimental” awareness of the divine Persons. Aquinas develops the doctrine of the image in such a way as to bring us to realize that our awareness of the Trinity develops through the image that is oneself. 

Amata notitia. The doctrine is startling in its conclusion as it is overarching in its complete command and delicate treatment of the elements of Catholic doctrine.

The life of the Indwelling is rooted in the sacramental structures of the Church. The heavy emphasis on sacramental symbolism that has been the dominant feature of post-Sacrosanctum Concilium theology sometimes obscures the plain fact of Catholic sacramental theology that the sacraments do something. They are signs to be sure, but signs that cause. No account of a sacramental theology is complete without some address of sacramental causality. In the address, “Current Challenges for Sacramental Theology,” Cardinal Godfried Danneels concedes that the theses dealing with sacramental causality require reworking: “Classical theologians have worked out a wide array of theories in response to this question [how do the sacraments bring forth their effects], but most of them are extremely difficult to uphold today.”34 The Belgian Cardinal’s view should forth their effects, but most of them are extremely difficult to uphold today.35 The life of the Indwelling is rooted in the sacramental structures of the Church. The heavy emphasis on sacramental symbolism that has been the dominant feature of post-Sacrosanctum Concilium theology sometimes obscures the plain fact of Catholic sacramental theology that the sacraments do something. They are signs to be sure, but signs that cause. No account of a sacramental theology is complete without some address of sacramental causality. In the address, “Current Challenges for Sacramental Theology,” Cardinal Godfried Danneels concedes that the theses dealing with sacramental causality require reworking: “Classical theologians have worked out a wide array of theories in response to this question [how do the sacraments bring forth their effects], but most of them are extremely difficult to uphold today.”34 The Belgian Cardinal’s view should forth their effects, but most of them are extremely difficult to uphold today.

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image-perfection, that is, they provide the way that Christ makes sons out of images. In the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the sacraments are divided into sacraments of healing and sacraments of initiation into and at the service of communion. Image-restoration, as the phrase suggests, brings about healing, whereas image-perfection creates and serves communion. Beatific fellowship or communion finds its anticipation here below in the Eucharist.

The Practice of Divine Friendship

The Eucharist introduces the theme of charity and communion. Only the saints love one another in a bond of authentic friendship. Sinners do not. When he comments on Summa theologiae Ila-Ilae q. 25, art. 7, which inquires whether sinners love themselves, the much maligned Cardinal Cajetan tells us why:

Guard in your heart the conclusions of this article:
(1) that evil is the kind of thing that makes it impossible for sinners to love themselves; (2) that there are five signs of authentic self-love, which can only be found in the good: to want to live a spiritual life in accord with right reason; to want to develop within this life the good of virtue; to want to act so as to realize this; to be free of anxiety; and to want to get along peacefully with others. Examine your conscience on these points if you want to know whether you are good or not, whether you truly love yourself, whether you truly are a friend to yourself. And do this frequently, at least once a day!¹³⁹

These considerations are hardly what one would describe as prescriptions drawn up by a man who was fixated on essentialism.

The practice of the divine friendship follows upon Aquinas’ teaching on the tripartite modes of the imago Dei and his very strong teaching on sacramental causality. What else can explain how fallen human beings can rise up to become authentic lovers of God and neighbor? One of the criticisms that should be made by Thomists of what I call inclusivist theologies, that is, those theologies that take umbrage at nature and grace distinctions, is that the promoters of these outlooks, whether stridently orthodox or shadowy heterodox, take too much for granted when it comes to explaining the dynamics of conversion. Leave aside the orthodox inclusivists, who in any event are usually loyal to what the Church prescribes for the moral life, and we find ourselves left with the widespread presumption promoted by the shadowy heterodox. When one reflects on the list of things that those who profess themselves to be Catholics hold to be compatible with Christian truth and virtue, it is stupefying. I would make every dissenting moral theologian read Cajetan’s commentary on whether sinners love themselves.

The Doctrine Today

What today is the importance of the doctrine of the image of God for Catholic life? How would I expound on the intuition expressed more than fifty years ago by Fr. Ferrer Smith? It would run something like this: We are made for happiness with God, but our capacity to achieve the realization of this beatitude, whether inchoatively on earth or consummatively in heaven, depends on the absolute priority of the divine initiative. God loves us because He is good, not because we are. The divine prevenient grace that governs all that transpires in the world for the good moves the human creature to the Church of Christ and to Baptism, which remains the only way that the Church knows to introduce a human creature into the fellowship of divine friendship. The 2000 Declaration Dominus Iesus reaffirms the advantages that one finds only within the circle of full communion with the See of Peter.

Baptism, as Aquinas says, is the door to the other sacraments.¹⁴⁰ Sacramental mediation marks every step of the Christian life and of the spiritual life. At the center of this communion, one embraces the Eucharist—the Sacrament of unity and charity. When Aquinas inquires whether it is fitting that the New Law contain certain specific counsels, he refers to the Book of Proverbs, 27:9: “the good counsels of a friend are sweet to the soul.” Aquinas wants to conclude that specific counsels are fitting for the New Law, and so he chooses a middle term for the argument that provides one of the best lines in the whole Summa theologiae: “Sed Christus maxime est sapiens et amicus.”¹⁴¹ Christ is the wisest and best friend.

This short text encapsulates the message that Aquinas would want us to take away tonight. To return to another text that I cited earlier in this presentation, Saint Thomas would encourage us to maintain an amata notitia, a loving awareness, of the presence of Christ in our lives. When we maintain the rhythm of abiding in Christ, as one would seek the companionship of a friend, then we discover the actualization of the image of grace and the divine sonship that Christ shares with the members of His Body. In a word, we become lovers of virtue and of the word of truth that maintains and strengthens virtue, and within this love of virtue, we discover true friendship, with both God and the neighbor. But nothing happens without our affective appropriation of the most important line in the Summa theologiae: Christ remains our wisest and best friend. ◊
References


2. The International Theological Commission observes: “Until the dawn of the modern period, the theology of the imago Dei retained its central position in theological anthropology. Throughout the history of Christian thought, such was the power and fascination of this theme that it could withstand those isolated critiques (as, for example, in iconoclam) which charged that its anthropomorphism fostered idolatry. But, in the modern period, the theology of the imago Dei came under a more sustained and systematic critique.” See the document of the International Theological Commission, “Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God,” no. 18.


5. Genesis 1: 26: “et ait faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram et praesit piscibus maris et volatilibus caelis et bestiis universaeque terrae omnique reptilii quod movetur in terra.”


8. Summa theologica Ia q. 93, prol. Translations used in this paper are those of the text found in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), vol. 13 (la 90–102), Man Made to God’s Image, by Edmund Hill, O.P.

9. See Summa theologica I q. 93, art. 9.

10. Summa theologica I q. 93, art. 9: “Utum autem, cum sit de transcendentibus, et commune est omnibus et ad singula potest aptari, sicut et bonum et verum.”


12. Summa theologica I q. 93, art. 9, ad 4: “Ad quatum dicendum quod dixi tibi verbi, quod est amata notitia, pertinent ad rationem imaginis; sed dixi tibi verbi pertinet ad similitudinem, sicut et veros.”

13. See Summa theologica I q. 93, art. 5: “God’s image is in man with reference to both the divine nature and the Trinity of persons.”

14. See Summa theologica Ila-IIae q. 106, art. 1, ad 3: “… cum vera amicitia supra virtutem fundetur.”


19. For example, an error of Balsus cited by Pope Pius V, “Ex omnibus afflictionibus” (1 Oct 1567): “Vita acterna homini integro et angelo promissa fuit intuitu bonum operum, et bona opera ex lege naturae ad illam consequendum per se sufficientia” (DS 19040).


24. These texts are found respectively at Summa theologica Ila q. 32, art. 3 and q. 9, art. 2.

25. See the document of the International Theological Commission, “Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God”: “In Thomas Aquinas, the imago Dei possesses an historical character, since it passes through three stages: the imago creationis (natura), the imago recreationis (gratiae), and the similitudinis (gloriae) (St Th. q. 93 a.4). For Aquinas, the imago Dei is the basis for participation in the divine life. The image of God is realized principally in an act of contemplation in the intellect (St Th. q. 93 a. 4 and 7). This conception can be distinguished from that of Bonaventure, for whom the image is realized chiefly through the will in the religious act of man (Sent. II d. 16 a. 2 q. 3). Within a similar mystical vision, but with a greater boldness, Meister Eckhart tends to spiritualize the imago Dei by placing it at the summit of the soul and detaching it from the body (Quint. 1, 5, 5–7; V, 6, 9a).”


27. Summa theologica Ila q. 32, art. 4.

28. Summa theologica Ila q. 23, art. 4.


30. See Di Noia, Imago Dei, p. 20. “Over thirty years ago, in one of the first theological commentaries on Gaudium et Spes, the now [2003] Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger argued that it is essential to take into account the intrinsic linking of anthropology with christology (and thus with eschatology) which unfolds across the entire text and which in his view constitutes its crucial insight.”

31. See Summa theologica Ila q. 93, art. 2, ad 3.

32. See Summa theologica Ila q. 23, art. 1.


36. See Pastores dabo Vobis, nos. 11, 13, 72.


38. See Jn 15: 5: “I am the vine: you the branches. He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit: for without me you can do nothing” (Douai-Rheims translation).

39. Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, In secundam-secundae q. 25, art. 4.

40. Summa theologica Ila q. 68, art. 6. See also, q. 66, art. 2.

41. Summa theologica Ila q. 108, art. 4, sed contra.